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ABSTRACT This paper explores the impact of globalisation on the working class in South Kor-
ea. Globalisation in South Korea has been distinctive in that it has taken place during the transi-
tion to democracy. While democratisation has empowered workers to organise, globalisation has
undermined the strength of the organised workers, segmenting regular workers from contingent
workers. The abrupt neo-liberal economic reforms that followed the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997-98
totally transformed the structure of the labour market, generating massive numbers of contingent
workers who are vulnerable to economic insecurity and social risks. Under the system of company
unions, the militant economic unionism that developed among unions in big corporations demon-
strated its limitations in promoting the interests of contingent workers. As the struggles of con-
tingent workers have expanded, social movement unionism, which uniﬁes labour issues and social
issues, has emerged as an alternative to militant economic unionism of unions composed of reg-
ular workers. This movement could provide a glimpse of a possible new future for the union move-
ment in other Asian countries that have experienced similar economic and political changes.
KEY WORDS: Globalisation, democratisation, South Korea, working class, contingent
workers, social movement unionism
Over the last two decades South Korea has experienced signiﬁcant changes in its
economy and politics due to democratisation and globalisation. These changes aﬀect
the working class in complex ways in which various actors engage in multifaceted
interactions including contestation, compromise and fragmentation. Democratisa-
tion in South Korea, as an important part of the contemporary political change,
empowered workers as their rights were enhanced from 1987. Since 1997, however,
neo-liberal globalisation, as the core of economic change, has undermined the power
of the working class, fragmenting and demoralising workers via the demands for
increasing ﬂexibility in the labour market. At the same time, the rise of citizens’
movements, at the core of social changes in the 1990s, had a negative impact on
working class movements, marginalising unions as a movement of particular interest
groups. However, the rise of essentially unorganised and contingent workers has
given vent to struggles that display a new type of labour movement, showing the
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possibility of an alliance between the labour and social movements. Those changes
were not concurrent, but sequentially diﬀerentiated, meaning that the complex of
changes has been remarkably dynamic in contemporary Korea. Though the
temporal sequence of those events was not predicted and prepared by social actors,
they signiﬁcantly aﬀected the working class through a changing matrix of choices for
individual workers and unions alike.
As the transition to democracy proceeded from June 1987, it turned out to be a
stormy process, wildly contested by diﬀerent political parties and social groups with
diﬀerent ideas of democracy. The authoritarian ruling party could maintain its rule,
as it won the ﬁrst general election by a slight margin due to the split of candidates in
the opposition camp. It could exercise power to delay democratic transition until it
ﬁnally lost power in the presidential election in 1997. The draconian labour relations
law, enacted by the military junta in 1981, was maintained until 1997 with the strong
support of business who opposed any attempt at revision. With delayed
democratisation, the labour movement could not avoid the legal and political
constraints until the successful revision of the labour relations law was ﬁnally
completed by the National Assembly in January 1997 (Shin 2003).
However, the ﬁnancial crisis that occurred in December 1997 curtailed the power
of the labour unions as massive layoﬀs were made. As bankruptcy, restructuring and
mergers and acquisitions expanded, the number of unemployed tripled in the ﬁrst
three months in 1998. The leadership of both union confederations, the older
Federation of Korea Trade Union (FKTU) and the new Korea Confederation of
Trade Union (KCTU), was also damaged with the crisis pact made by the state,
labour and business, permitting company layoﬀs for ‘‘reasonable’’ managerial
reasons. Particularly, the KCTU was engulfed in a leadership crisis, as its leader,
who had joined the tripartite agreement, was criticised by rank and ﬁle members, and
eventually resigned. The internal dispute in 1998 set the limits for the leadership of
the KCTU to act (Roh, 2008: 176-80).
Signiﬁcantly, the timing of neo-liberal economic reform and the political transition
from an authoritarian to a democratic regime coincided in South Korea. The Kim
Dae Jung government, the ﬁrst democratic government, carried out neo-liberal
economic reforms. It implemented a package of economic reforms, guided by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). This included four major reforms: privatisa-
tion of public corporations, enhancement of labour market ‘‘ﬂexibility,’’ opening the
ﬁnancial market and governance reforms of the big family-owned corporations or
chaebol. While the last reform was unique to South Korea, the other three belong to
the core of neo-liberal reform around the world (Harvey, 2005; Stiglitz 2000). The
goal of this neo-liberal reform was to transform identiﬁed ‘‘crony capitalism’’ in
which the developmental state controlled the economy, distorting the dynamics of
the market. As South Korea was a member of the Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the Korean ﬁnancial market was partially
opened in 1996. After the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis, the newly democratised regime
pushed ahead with a full suite of neo-liberal reforms under the guidance of the IMF.
The impact of the neo-liberal reforms was more severe for workers than any other
social class, simply because the enhancement of labour market ﬂexibility was directly
related to mass layoﬀs and much increased unemployment. So-called ﬂexible
employment was expanded with the introduction of new types of contingent work,
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such as indirect employment, short-term employment, dispatched workers,
subcontracting workers and so on.1 As many companies hired contingent employees
when they hired new employees or they replaced existing regular workers with new
contingent workers, the proportion of the contingent workers rapidly increased after
1998. While the rate of contingent workers varies according to the deﬁnition used, it
is conservatively estimated at almost 34% of total employment (Ministry of Labour,
2008). Hiring contingent employees became a dominant employment practice so as
to minimise the labour costs of ﬁrms. While organised workers – almost 10% of the
total number of employees – were protected by the unions, unorganised workers
were vulnerable to labour market dynamics. Shifting the boundaries of employment
has produced a fragmentation of the working class, eroding the sense of solidarity
among workers.
However, contingent workers began to organise themselves with the help of social
movement organisations. Unionised workers have been less interested in the issues
related to contingent workers. Indeed, contingent workers, who are usually
considered as the most diﬃcult workers to organise, began to organise themselves
and this resulted in some ﬁerce strikes in 2008. The rise of contingent workers
indicates the new types of working class movement, potentially providing a common
ground for the alliance of social movements and the working class movement. The
cleavage within the working class and the shift of the labour struggle under neo-
liberal globalisation in South Korea might shed light on the future of the working
class movement in Asia.
Democratisation and Workers’ Contestation
The authoritarian regime that continued for more than two decades surrendered to
the long struggle for democracy in June 1987. The fall of the Marcos regime in the
Philippines heralded the beginning of the domino eﬀect of democratisation in East
Asia including the Philippines, Korea and Taiwan. Like people’s power in Manila,
massive demonstrations in June 1987 overrode the police’s power, demanding the
end of the dictatorship and democratisation of the political regime. As white-collar
workers and other citizens began to join the students’ struggle against military
dictatorship, the regime conceded to negotiations on democratisation. Their main
concern was to avoid the complete collapse of the regime as had happened in the
Philippines (Shin, 1999: 124-5).
Democratisation in South Korea displays two signiﬁcant features. First, the major
actors who successfully forced the military regime to accept the demand for
democratisation did not have an opportunity to engage in the negotiation for
democratisation. Student organisations that played the most important role in the
June Democratisation Struggle were totally excluded from political bargaining.
Opposition parties that monopolised the power to negotiate for the transition to
democracy shielded the inﬂuence of the radical political demands from the outset as
part of a deal in secret to drive the street protesters away from the negotiating table.
Secondly, while the working class played a leading role in the introduction of
democracy in Western Europe, allying with peasants, the middle class or bourgeoisie
(see Marks, 1989; Rueschemeyer et al., 1993; Therborn, 1977), the working class did
not play a signiﬁcant role in the Korean struggle for democratisation. Instead, in
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South Korea, the well-organised student movement and political opposition
movements succeeded in mobilising the masses in favour of democracy, as the
authoritarian regime relied on a brutally oppressive apparatus to counter pro-
democracy movements. Most Korean workers did not engage in the democratisation
movement, although some labour activists led protest movements against the
authoritarian regime in some regions.
Labour Oﬀensive
Major strikes took place immediately after the authoritarian regime, faced with
popular protests, announced negotiations for democratic transition with opposition
party leaders. The explosion of strikes in the summer of 1987 followed the earlier
spring struggle for democracy by students and activists. As more than four million
demonstrators participated in the street demonstrations that took place across the
country from 10 to 29 June, the authoritarian regime ﬁnally gave in and negotiated
the revision of the constitution with opposition parties (Johnson, 1989; Lim, 1994).
Workers successfully utilised this opportunity provided by the democratisation
movement. The authoritarian government, severely weakened by the popular
challenge, lost the capacity to oppress the labour movement.
The eruption of labour strikes occurred on a gigantic scale and spread with
alarming speed across the country. As Table 1 shows, the number of strikes exploded
in 1987, with 3,749 strikes, which was 13.6 times higher than in 1986. Almost 70% of
the strikes were related to demands for wage increases. The second largest
proportion was about working conditions. The timing of this explosion of strikes
is important for understanding the nature of contestation by Korean workers.
Almost 88.3% of the strikes were concentrated in the summer of 1987. The largest
number of strikes in a single month in Korean history was in August 1987 (2,469),
with 880 strikes in a single week, 17-23 August (Ministry of Labour, 1988: 17). These
were all illegal strikes and, most strikingly, more than 45% of them took place at













1975 133 32 42 7 10 19 4 19
1980 407 287 38 11 5 – 14 52
1985 265 61 84 12 22 12 47 27
1986 276 48 75 11 34 16 48 44
1987 3,749 45 2,613 11 51 65 566 398
1988 1,873 59 946 20 110 59 136 543
1989 1,616 59 742 30 81 10 21 673
1990 322 10 167 6 18 – 2 119
1991 234 5 132 – 7 – 2 88
1992 235 27 134 – 4 – – 70
1993 144 11 66 1 1 – – 65
Source: KLI Labour Statistics (1994: 180).
214 K.-Y. Shin
companies without unions. They were so-called wildcat strikes, displaying the
spontaneity of strikes of unorganised workers. Mass grievances exploded with the
weakening power of the authoritarian regime’s security forces.
Organisational revolution followed the hot summer of strikes in 1987. Workers
who were engaged in wildcat strikes began to organise themselves as unions. Union
membership increased by 34.7% from 1,267,457 to 1,707,456 for the six-month
period from July to December in 1987. The total number of unions increased from
2,742 to 4,103 (by 49.6%) for the same period. The organisational power of unions
culminated in 1989 with 7,883 unions and 1,932,415 union members (Shin, 1999:
166-7). The rate of unionisation also drastically increased from 15.7% in 1987 to
19.8% in 1989.
One of the most signiﬁcant developments for the labour movement was the
unionisation of workers in big companies, including within the chaebols. The
Hyundai Group companies, all non-unionised before 1987, were all unionised. After
the workers in Hyundai Engine Corporation succeeded in establishing a union on 5
July 1987, Hyundai Group unions played a leading role in unionising the workplaces
of the Southern industrial belt in August 1987 (Koo, 2002: 154-69). As the owner of
Hyundai Group did not recognise unions and tried to destroy them by violence,
Hyundai companies became the scene of battles between workers and managers.
Workers marched in the streets of downtown Ulsan, a new industrial city, where
most Hyundai companies were located. More radical repertoires of protest, such as
sit-down strikes and occupations of factories, were introduced to ﬁght management
oppression. With widespread demonstrations by workers, the Hyundai Group could
not but help but recognise de facto the unions as counterparts in collective
bargaining after several failed attempts to abolish the unions. The Union of Hyundai
Shipbuilding Company and Union of Hyundai Automobile Company became
leading organisations for the decade of the union movement (Koo, 2002: 165-75).
Another important development was the rise of the independent union movement,
called the ‘‘democratic union movement.’’ Under the authoritarian regime, most
unions aﬃliated with the FKTU were company unions sponsored by management
and by the government. The government tightly controlled unions, prohibiting
independent unions and industrial unions from engaging in political activities.
Workers’ organisations could be recognised as a legitimate union only if they had a
permit issued by a government agency. Since the labour relations law did not allow
plural unions within a company, only one union was legally allowed. Management
attempted to control break-away unions with the help of police and security forces.
In explicitly criticising the orientation of existing unions recognised by the
government, however, newly organised unions pursued independence from their
managers and the government, framing labour relation issues with broader political
democratisation issues.
During the ﬁrst year of democratic transition, there was a consensus among
diﬀerent political parties that the revision of the undemocratic labour relations law
was necessary. The authoritarian ruling party reluctantly endorsed the revision of the
labour relations law under the pressure of massive labour strikes. The massive labour
oﬀensive in the summer of 1987 enforced the ruling party to pursue labour relations
reform, which was discussed in the National Assembly in July 1987 (Roh, 2008: 54;
Shin, 2000). As labour strikes paralysed the enforcement of the existing labour
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relations law, its revision was considered inevitable. The revised bill was passed
despite strong opposition from business. The main contents of the revised bill
included the abolition of the one company union rule, the government’s right to
dissolve a union and the regulation of union leaders’ qualiﬁcation. However,
President Roh Tae Woo vetoed the revised law in 1988, supporting the demands
of business groups. With the president’s veto, the labour relations law formed
under the authoritarian regime survived into the post-authoritarian era. Thus, the
revision of labour relations law has become a litmus test for Korean democracy since
1988.
Although the labour relations law could not be revised, some unions began to
organise more concerted activities outside their work places. Unions in the Southern
industrial belt succeeded in making broader regional solidarity networks by
December 1988. The joint activities under the name of the National Headquarters
for Labour Law Reform were the beginnings of broader union activities. They
culminated with the formation of the National Council of Regional and Industrial
Trade Unions in 1990. It was the ﬁrst nation-wide union organisation that led to the
establishment of the KCTU in 1995 (Roh 2008: 30-5).
Fierce contestation among labour, capital and the state continued until civilian
president Kim Young Sam, was inaugurated in February 1993, after more than 30
years of military rule. Kim, who was a former opposition leader and later joined the
ruling authoritarian party, won the presidential election in December 1992. In his
ﬁrst year of presidency, Kim tried to show himself as a reformer so as to compensate
for his betrayal of the opposition camp when he changed sides. Since he described
himself as a ‘‘Trojan horse’’ to conquer state power from inside and reform it, he
needed to show his reformist image to make the distinction between himself and the
former ex-military generals who had been presidents.
From the beginning, the Kim government tried to revise the labour relations law
as one of its core reforms, and this became a site of contestation between labour
and business once more. President Kim designated former human rights lawyer
Lee In-Je as the Minister of Labour, and Lee promised to revise the labour
relations law to purge the legacy of past authoritarian regimes. Lee initiated the
revision of the law to promote worker’s legal status. Business leaders were upset by
Kim’s reform drive and Lee’s attempt to guarantee workers’ rights by revising the
labour law and the strike at Hyundai Group became a test case of the new labour
policy for the Kim government. The government proclaimed that it would not
intervene in the dispute and demanded an autonomous resolution between union
and management. As the strike continued for three months, the Korea Employers
Federation criticised Minister Lee for undermining industrial relations with this
non-intervention policy (Shin, 2003: 155). In general, the business community
became antagonistic towards reforms by the government. Examples included
opposition to rules governing the opening of bank accounts and the banning of
corporate funds. The tension between the ruling party and business culminated
with the declaration of the candidacy of Chung Joo Young, the owner of the
Hyundai Group, for president in 1992.2 It was the ﬁrst time a business leader had
deﬁed the ruling party in South Korea. As Kim won the presidential election,
business expected that there might be some changes in the relationship between
itself and the government. Kim’s reform policy and Lee’s attempt to revise the
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labour relations law was regarded as retaliation against business deﬁance toward
the ruling government.
Business responded to the changing political environment by reducing new
investment. This amounted to a collective inaction fully utilising its economic veto
power or by divesting production. Analogous to a workers’ strike, this was a ‘‘capital
strike’’ characterised by inaction of the capitalist class. This capital strike induced an
economic downturn (Shin, 2003: 152-3). Gross ﬁxed capital investment declined by
12.4% during the ﬁrst quarter of 1993, compared to the same period in 1992. It was a
consecutive drop of the gloss capital investment by 9.5% from the fourth quarter of
1992. The lack of new investment and a declining economy became immediate
threats to the new government which tried to show its ability to boost up the sagging
economy. At that time President Kim had launched the ambitious New Economic
Policy to show his ability to boost the economy in his ﬁrst 100 days in oﬃce. As the
index of leading indicators deteriorated, however, President Kim became alarmed
and rebuﬀed or attenuated reforms harmful to business. He halted the revision of the
labour relations law by replacing Lee with Nam Jae Hee, a conservative former
journalist. Nam postponed the revision of the labour relations law without any
concrete time schedule for its completion. The capital strike was legal and the most
eﬀective collective action by capitalists and yielded a genuine veto over the state (see
Block, 1987: 58-61). Unlike labour, the power of the capitalist class was in its
ownership of capital, not in a mass rally or a sit-in.
Joining the Uruguay Round in 1993 and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in
1994, South Korea faced a totally diﬀerent international economic environment
from the previous period. President Kim began to emphasise internationalisation
and later globalisation. Both discourses on internationalisation and globalisation
focused on enhancing international competitiveness in a broad sense. In the
discourse on globalisation, competitiveness became a policy key word in economics,
politics, administration, education and culture. Globalisation was used as a political
slogan rather than a concept to understand social change at the global level. In fact,
it referred to aggressive economic nationalism that meant simply marching toward
the international market for more exports and larger proﬁts. A mercantilist concept
of trade was again accentuated by the government as pressure from foreign
countries, including America, became stronger in terms of trade.
As Japan and South Korea rapidly expanded their share in the consumer market
of the USA and Europe, their trade deﬁcit became a source of conﬂict. The OECD
and the US Federal Reserve Bank demanded the abolition of tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ
barriers for goods and services in South Korea (Dong-A Daily, 29 February 1992).
While the government still regarded South Korea as a developing country, the USA
and the European Union countries considered it a developed country, even as a
second to Japan in Asia. The USA had already passed the Super 301 code in 1988 to
lessen its trade deﬁcit by retaliating against unfair trade, and implemented this code
against both Japan and South Korea.
Facing rising pressure from the USA and Europe, President Kim responded with
an aggressive measure. His government established a working committee in April
1993 to prepare for South Korea’s membership to the OECD. Full membership
implied that South Korea should accept all the institutional rules and policy
guidelines of the OECD. It included changes of rules and norms related to industrial
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relations as well as deregulation of the ﬁnancial market and the foreign exchange
market. The OECD granted South Korea conditional membership in October 1997.
It was conditional because the labour relations law had not been brought up to par
with the rules and norms of OECD members. But South Korea’s membership was
important to the OECD, as the Korean economy grew. Thus, without changing
labour-management relations, measures for deregulation of the market were
implemented by the Korean government. This meant that globalisation proceeded
without abolishing the authoritarian legacies in labour relations or the economic
rules of the game.
Labour’s response to internationalisation and globalisation was to demand that
the reform of the labour relations law match international standards. Criticising
the government’s postponement of the reform, in 1995 labour activists who led the
democratic union movement ﬁnally established the KCTU, openly violating the
labour relations law. It was an attempt to challenge government’s authority to
impose authoritarian labour laws and to control union activities even after
becoming an OECD member. Accordingly, the KCTU was essentially an illegal
confederation of democratic labour unions, symbolising the establishment of an
alternative national union centre to the FKTU. While the FKTU represented the
old style of union movement, sponsored by the state, the KCTU represented the
new militant unionism challenging the FKTU. The two peak organisations have
played crucial roles in articulating diﬀerent interests of workers and representing
opposing political orientations. The KCTU initiated a struggle for social reform
under the slogan of ‘‘from factory to society,’’ raising social issues beyond the
workplace. It included ﬁve major demands: integration of a divided health care
system; democratic management of the national pension system; tax reform;
regulation of the concentration of economic power; and educational reform. The
new strategy of the KCTU was based on social movement unionism that combined
unions with social movements so as to defend the basic rights of citizen as well as
workers (Roh, 2008: 132-6).
Revision of the Labour Relations Law and General Strikes
In order to facilitate full membership of the OECD, the Kim government needed to
complete the revision of the labour relations law ahead of the ﬁnal year of Kim’s
presidency. The government installed a Presidential Committee for Industrial
Relations Reform (PCIRR) composed of representatives of labour, capital, the state
and the public in May 1996. It was the third attempt to revise the labour relations
law, postponed in 1993, prior to Korea’s full membership of the OECD. Each
interest group suggested its own version of a labour relations law without
negotiation. Naturally, the business federations and the union confederations
proposed conﬂicting demands. While labour focused on revision of the labour law
applied to workers, business emphasised increased ﬂexibility of the labour market.
Interestingly, the government contributed to intensifying conﬂicts within the PCIRR
as the two government agencies on the committee had diﬀerent orientations. While
the Ministry of Labour demanded enhancement of labour rights, the Ministry of
Economy and Finance emphasised the competitiveness of Korean goods and services
as a principle of revising labour relations law (Roh, 1996; Shin, 2003: 163-4).
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As expected, the third round for the revision of the labour relations law did not
succeed in generating a consensus among diﬀerent interest groups with respect to
three major items. These were the code of the prohibition of industrial union, the
code of the prohibition of teachers’ union and public sector union, and the code of
the government’s intervention into union activity. The unions claimed the codes
violated the basic rights of workers. However, the government and business opposed
the revision of the undemocratic labour relations law even after the transition toward
democracy started. While international human rights organisations as well as the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) demanded the revision of the labour law
according to international standards, the tug-of-war in the PCIRR ended in a failure
to formulate an agreement on these issues. The government transferred the draft to
the National Assembly to revise the law in December 1996. The ruling party rushed
the bill through at dawn on 26 December 1996, eﬀectively keeping out the opposition
party from the meeting. In fact, the ruling party’s revised labour relations law was
much worse than the government’s version of the bill for labour. For example, while
the government’s bill allowed plural unions at the national level immediately, the
ruling party’s bill postponed the legalisation on plural unions for ﬁve more years.
The early morning passage of the laws provoked a public outcry, shocked by
tactics reminiscent of military rule when the ruling party in the 1970s and 1980s
would force through controversial issues despite opposition. Immediately, the
KCTU declared a nationwide general strike as a protest. Opinion leaders, such as
church leaders, writers, professors and artists, declared support for the general strike
by workers. Public opposition to the passage of the laws became stronger in spite of
the holiday season. As the KTCU, white collar workers and researchers at institutes
also joined the general strike, the ruling party was bewildered by such an unexpected
spread of protest across the nation. In addition, international organisations, such as
the ILO and the OECD, also accused the Korean government of an undemocratic
way of passing the revised labour relations law and the unqualiﬁed nature of the law
(Korea Times, 12 January 1997). In addition, the government was accused by the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions for violating convention of 88
and 89 of the ILO in 28 December 1996. John Sweeny, the chairman of AFL-CIO,
demanded President Kim Young Sam veto the bill (Shin, 2003: 165). Facing such
pressures, the government sought to revise the labour relations law again, in January
1997. The scandal of the revision of the labour relations law severely damaged
President Kim’s leadership.
The success of the general strike mostly beneﬁted the KCTU since it initiated the
nationwide action and mobilised mass protests supported by civic organisations and
citizens. Though the KCTU was still an illegal organisation, it became a de facto
national centre for the new labour movement. Political parties that joined the rally
against the passage of the labour relations law became more inclined to the demands
of the KCTU. While the FKTU did eventually join the strike, it was too late to take
a leading role.
Globalisation and the Fragmentation of the Working Class
Political change took place when Kim Dae Jung, the long-time opposition leader,
won the presidential election in December 1997. It was a political watershed with
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sweeping reforms of bureaucratic organisations and the remaking of the relationship
between the state and civil society. However, the new democratic government had
two severe constraints from the beginning. First, the winning of the presidential
election was possible due to a liberal-conservative coalition. Kim Dae Jung did not
get enough support to be elected as an independent candidate. Therefore, he made an
alliance with a very conservative politician, Kim Jong Pil. Those who voted for Kim
Dae Jung were only 40.3% of votes from just a 32.5% turnout.3 Hence, Kim Dae
Jung did not have much room to manoeuvre in political reform, since he had
designated Kim Jong Pil as prime minister from 1998. This strange cohabitation
collapsed after six months, shaking the social basis of the new regime.
Secondly, Kim Dae Jung could only win the 1997 presidential election thanks to
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. The ﬁnancial crisis revealed the poor governability of the
Kim Young Sam government and the ruling party. Since collapse of the ﬁnancial
market derived from the policy failures and the structural problems of the economic
system formed during the authoritarian regime, a signiﬁcant number of the middle
class voted for Kim Dae Jung. While he had some beneﬁt from the ﬁnancial crisis,
after getting elected, he had to resolve the economic crisis.
The ﬁnancial crisis and democratic transition generated an unprecedented
dilemma for the new government. Contacting international ﬁnancial organisations,
Kim Dae Jung was already searching for measures to rescue the troubled economy
before his inauguration. Since the government and the IMF made an agreement in
November 1997 that the IMF provided a rescue fund to Korea on the condition that
the following government pursued IMF policy guidelines. Kim Dae Jung’s
government did not have an option other than taking on the required neo-liberal
economic reforms. The new government accepted these IMF demands for two
reasons. First, the demands from the IMF were not new since the Kim Young Sam
government had tried to carry out similar reforms in 1993. That ﬁrst reform drive
included policies abolishing the legacies of the developmental state by changing
ownership structures of big corporations, privatising public enterprises and
deregulating the labour market (Cho, 1996: 169-71). The reforms mostly failed
due to strong resistance from business. Those policies were exactly the same as the
reform policies that the IMF demanded of the Kim Dae Jung government during the
economic crisis.
Secondly, Kim Dae Jung did not have any policy alternatives to resolve the
economic crisis except by following the IMF policy guidelines. While he wrote a
book on the people’s economy before he became president, emphasising economic
democracy and equality, he did not provide a set of feasible policies. He simply tried
to resolve the economic crisis as soon as possible and thus followed the IMF’s
recommendations. The IMF, symbolic of the Washington Consensus, prescribed
economic policies that undermined companies already in big trouble because of over-
investment and over-borrowing. Required high interest rates directly contributed to
the collapse of many companies. The result was that half of the 36 largest chaebol
designated by the Fair Trade Committee in 1993 had collapsed by 1998 (see Lee and
Uh, 2000: 43).
President-elect Kim Dae Jung tried to achieve an agreement to overcome conﬂicts
of interest among the state, labour and capital. Industrial conﬂicts were re-emerging
based on antagonisms and confrontations from the 1990s. To forge a compromise, in
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early January 1998 he established a Tripartite Commission that would deal with
labour issues among economic actors. The Commission consisted of representatives
from two union confederations, employer associations and government oﬃcials. One
of the president’s associates was designated as its chairman. Within a month, these
representatives reached an agreement to overcome the economic crisis, called ‘‘Social
Pact for Overcoming the Economic Crisis.’’ This was a ‘‘big deal’’ between labour
and capital. As long as the state legalised teachers’ rights to organise and unions’
political activity, the unions accepted enhancing labour market ﬂexibility (Lee and
Ryu, 2001: 193). It was the ﬁrst social pact initiated by the state.
In general, the formation of the Tripartite Commission and the social pact did not
bring about any signiﬁcant change in the relationship between labour and capital
since the status of the Commission was weak so that bureaucrats hostile to labour
unions did not pay much attention to it. Many Commission policies and decisions
were not practically implemented. It was simply symbolic of social consensus for
overcoming the economic crisis rather than a practical organisation. While it
continues to exist, the inﬂuence of the Commission remains minimal in industrial
relations, and it has failed to formulate any meaningful social consensus between
state, labour and capital.
Furthermore, the hasty bargaining of the KCTU leaders with the government in
dealing with the labour market issues provoked massive protests from the KCTU’s
own rank and ﬁle. The accord allowed business to layoﬀ redundant workers for
‘‘legitimate managerial reasons’’ and to hire non-standard or contingent workers.
Leaders of the KCTU accepted capital’s demand for labour market ﬂexibility in
exchange for workers’ rights to organise. The acceptance of the enhancement of
labour market ﬂexibility meant the acceptance of mass layoﬀs. As business did not
keep to the agreement and sacked workers without legitimate reasons and the
government acknowledged this, the KCTU leadership was severely undermined.
Eventually the KCTU chairman resigned with an internal reprimand and the KCTU
was engulfed in organisational turmoil. Diﬀerent factions were struggling to gain the
upper hand within the KCTU. Accusing the government and business, the KCTU
left the Tripartite Commission and called general strikes to force business to keep to
its agreement. It produced another cleavage between the KCTU and the FKTU with
respect to membership of the Tripartite Commission. As the KCTU took an
antagonistic stance on the Commission, the FKTU faced a dilemma since the FKTU
did not share the same position on the pending issues such as the demand for
renegotiation with the IMF and policies for the unemployed workers. The result was
that in 1998 the KCTU and the FKTU ended up with opposing political aﬃliations.
The KCTU formed the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) in 2000. The DLP
eventually won nine seats in the National Assembly, aided by the introduction of
proportional representation in 2004. In contrast, the FKTU established the Green
Social Democratic Party (GSDP) in 2004. However, as the majority of members of
the FKTU supported the conservative Grand National Party, the GSDP was
dissolved following the failure to get any seats in the 2004 general election (Kwon,
2004).
The impact of the Social Pact on the labour market and industrial relations was
profound. While the Commission became paralysed with withdrawal of the KCTU,
the government implemented the controversial pact immediately. Enhanced labour
Globalisation and the Working Class in South Korea 221
market ﬂexibility was made possible through massive layoﬀs and the replacement of
regular workers with contingent workers. The number of unemployed soared to 1.81
million in December 1998 from 672,000 a year earlier. It meant that more than
100,000 workers were newly dismissed every month in 1998. Unions became more
defensive than before as massive layoﬀs became an ordinary scene in the economy.
While there were strikes against plant closings and delayed payment of wages, strikes
dwindled signiﬁcantly amidst the economic crisis. Workers were more concerned
about job security than wage increases. General strikes called by the KCTU failed
several times due to the lukewarm participation of members. In 2002, the rate of
unemployment returned to pre-1997 levels.
While the unemployment rate seems to have returned to the average level, the
labour market has been fundamentally restructured in radically diﬀerent ways,
mainly due to a rapid growth of contingent workers. In discussions with the
government, deﬁnitions of contingent workers have been highly contested. The
government has maintained low estimates to downplay the issue of contingent
workers, whereas the labour camps have insisted on high estimates to disclose the
dark side of the government’s neo-liberal economic policies.4 Nevertheless, they
share the fact that there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of non-standard
workers by almost one million, almost 10 percentage points, from the last decade
(Kim, 2008b; KLI, 2008). Now more than one third of the total employees in South
Korea are contingent workers, the highest level among OECD countries.
Most estimates of the proportion of contingent workers range from 36% to 57%,
according to the diﬀerent deﬁnition of non-standard workers used. For example,
while Kim Yoo-Sun (2001), a director of the private labour institute, argues that the
rate was almost 57% in 2001, Ahn Ju-Youp and others (in Ahn et al., 2007: 182), a
group of researchers from the Korea Labour Institute, a government-sponsored
institute, argue that it was around 36.6% in 2005. Kim (2008b) estimated that the
rate of non-standard workers was 52.1% (more than 8 million workers) in 2007.
Finally, the Tripartite Commission estimates that the rate of non-standard workers
in 2008 was 35.9% or more than 5 million workers (KLI, 2008).
For the last decade, workers have been divided into two groups, standard workers
and non-standard workers, displaying sharp diﬀerences in terms of wages and social
protections. While unionised workers could protect themselves in their companies,
non-unionised workers could not ﬁnd any device or protection from the whip of the
market. As Table 2 presents, there is a sharp diﬀerentiation in terms of social
protection. Contingent employees are not properly protected by the social safety net.
Even though the welfare system was introduced in the late 1990s and the early 2000s,
a large proportion of workers are still excluded from social protection.
Because unions have been organised as company unions, non-unionised workers
could not get any help from unions. Only peak union organisations attempted to
intervene in the process of making of laws and policies, mobilising limited power and
sometimes allying with social movement organisations. But this was not eﬀective
enough to improve the economic and social status of non-standard workers simply
because it did not have enough organisational leverage to mobilise union members in
companies. Workers organised by company unions did not show much interest in
issues beyond the factory gates. In addition, the DLP, formed in 2000, did not have
enough power to inﬂuence national politics and the government’s policies. Labour’s
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power was also too limited to mobilise eﬀective measures in countering the neo-
liberal economic policies.
Neo-liberal labour market reform damaged not only unorganised workers but also
union organisations themselves. Unions became more defensive in protecting jobs
and the wages of members. Mostly they succeeded in keeping jobs and increasing
wages. In particular, unions in big corporations could maintain their privileges in
terms of job security and decent wages. However, unions retreated from social
concerns. By the early 2000s, unions that had led social reform in the 1980s and early
1990s came to conﬁne themselves within the companies.
For the companies, contingent workers remained an attractive option. Manage-
ment can easily continue to hire non-standard workers when union members retire.
Unions recognised that management employment practices were not greatly aﬀected
by the new employment practices. As Figure 1 shows, the proportion of union
members has been steadily declining since 1989 when the rate peaked at 18.2%. The
revised labour relations law allowed for two progressive unions of teachers and
public sector workers to be legalised in 1998 and 2006, respectively. However, the
trend to low rates of unionisation has not changed. Now below 10%, this is the
second lowest among OECD members, after France. Despite this, in France, more
than 90% of workers are covered by collective bargaining. South Korea might be an
exceptional case with the lowest union density and the lowest coverage of collective
bargaining (OECD, 2004: 145; Traxler, 1998).
Legislative eﬀorts to protect the increasing numbers of non-standard workers began
in the National Assembly in 2001. After ﬁve years of a tug-of-war between labour,
capital and the state, the labour law on contingent workers was passed in December
2006. While labour unions demandedmore eﬀective protection for contingent workers
by restricting job categories that could hire such labour, employer organisations
argued for a more ﬂexible labour market. The new labour law meant that employers
should change the employment status of contingent workers to regular workers after
two years of employment. However, this labour law, eﬀective since June 2007, failed to
protect the vulnerable contingent workers since many employers discharged
contingent workers before two years had passed and utilised indirect employment
by outsourcing workers through employment service ﬁrms (Lee and Chung, 2008: 11).
Indirect employment, such as dispatched workers or subcontract workers, proliferated
immediately after the enactment of this new labour law.
The fragmentation of the working class has grown with an inﬂux of foreign
workers since the early 1990s. The number of foreign workers has rapidly increased







Health insurance 76.5 17.6
Unemployment insurance 70.0 19.0
Industrial injury insurance 69.1 20.5
Source: Korea Development Institute (2006: 3).
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due to the rising labour cost of Korean workers. Now foreign workers comprise
more than 5% of the total employees. The number of foreign workers doubled
between 2002 and 2007 (Korea Migration Service, 2003; 2008). Most foreign workers
are unskilled workers employed in the labour-intensive sectors, such as construction,
service and manufacturing, and they are doing the low-paid, dangerous, dirty and
diﬃcult jobs in South Korea. They are the lowest strata of the working class but vital
to the Korean economy. They are also the least protected workers without any
organisational protection. Instead of unions, social movement organisations or
churches help them adjust to the new environment and protect their legal rights.
Some foreign workers attempted to organise a union by themselves but to no avail.
New Union Movements
Recently, collective movements of contingent workers have become more visible as
they have staged several lengthy strikes. Contingent workers’ strikes succeeded in
bringing the harsh realities of their situation into public view. So far, issues related to
contingent workers were overshadowed by those of unionised workers who had an
institutional leverage. When contingent workers’ strikes went on for more than one
year, they drew public attention and gained support from social movement
organisations.
Figure 1. Rate of unionisation, 1985-2005. The top line refers to the rate of unionisation and
the lower line indicates the rate of unionisation if the teacher’s union was excluded. Source:
Kim (2008a: 5).
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The rise in strikes by contingent workers displayed a new development in South
Korea’s labour movement, with three distinct features. First, major actors in the
labour movement have shifted from regular workers in big companies to contingent
workers in small- and medium-sized companies.
Secondly, the strikes have tended to be prolonged. Because management does not
recognise the demands of contingent workers as legitimate, it tends to take longer in
reaching a compromise. For example, the strike at E-land, a clothing store,
continued for more than 500 days. It ended when another company bought E-Land
and accepted the demands of the strikers (Hwang, 2008). The strike in Koscom, a
computing sub-contractor company of stock traders, went on for 475 days until the
striking workers succeeded in changing their status from irregular to regular workers
(Yeo, 2008). A strike by women contingent workers at Kiryung Electronics has
lasted more than four years. Although the strikes were not visible from the
beginning, they began to catch public attention once the labour law dealing with the
status of contingent workers came into eﬀect in 2007.
Thirdly, strikes by contingent workers are much more complex than those of
unionised workers. Contingent workers utilised a diverse repertoire of collective
action, such as staged hunger strikes, sit-in protests and street rallies, with the help of
labour activists, radical students and citizens. A recently emerging strategy is for
demonstrations on top of television towers or sit-down demonstrations. Contingent
workers, lacking resources, have tried to get public attention rather than seeking
support from big unions. In addition, the internet and other online media outlets
became important resources for strikers to communicate with broader society.
The rise of these contingent worker struggles suggests a new way forward for
Korea’s labour movement. While regular workers’ unions in big corporations still
exert strong bargaining power at their companies, they have failed to lead the
working class in the struggle against the wave of neo-liberal globalisation. On the
other hand, the contingent worker movement has emerged as a new grass roots
labour movement challenging neo-liberalism.
The possibility of a new labour movement was also fostered by the development of
social movements. The recent development of social movements has been one of the
most remarkable social changes in Korean civil society. As social movements, often
called citizen’s movements, proliferated in the 1990s, the relationship between unions
and social movement organisations became a critical issue. Most social movement
organisations were concerned primarily with non-class issues, such as human rights,
consumer rights, housing issues, water pollution, social welfare and tax justice.
Nevertheless, there were some personal networks between social movement activists
and labour activists since some of them commonly participated in the democratisa-
tion movement during the authoritarian period.
However, the diversiﬁcation of social movement organisations in the late 1990s
created new types of social movement organisations that focused on speciﬁc issues.
As the democratic transition proceeded, commonality between social movement
organisations and labour unions rapidly dwindled. Labour unions also experienced
new developments. The role of labour activists diminished and union leaders with
shop ﬂoor experience came to comprise the larger part of the union leadership.
Meanwhile, social movement organisations have concentrated on broad social and
political issues, with less interest in the workplace issues, such as wages and
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working conditions. Frequent labour strikes had led social movement organisations
to keep a distance from union aﬀairs since maintaining public support was
important for these organisations. Social movement organisations began to play a
leading role in protest movements, representing public goods, criticising the
corruption of politicians and bureaucrats, and raising new demands for social
justice and public interests. In contrast, labour unions came to be regarded as self-
serving and only seeking private goods within the company, ignoring broader
social issues.
The rising contingent workers’ struggle has changed this picture and a new
alignment has brought labour and social movement organisations closer together.
Labour rights organisations and various anti-globalisation organisations joined the
struggle to support contingent workers. Since their struggle took place outside big
companies, it was easier for social movement activists to join the strikes and
demonstrations. As issues of contingent workers become more politicised, uniﬁed
action by various social groups becomes more feasible. In contrast to the waning
popular support for the union movement of regular workers’ unions, the
contingent workers’ movement is gaining more support from the masses (Lee,
2009).
In recent years, the success of strikes by contingent workers indicates the potential
strength of coalitions between social and labour movements. Several ﬁerce strikes by
contingent workers succeeded in protecting jobs and improving employment status.
At the same time, job insecurity and the low wages of contingent workers can be a
core issue for all citizens with an ever-increasing number of contingent workers. It
implies that issues related to contingent workers are social issues as well as labour
issues. Thus social movement organisations, citizens, and workers are able to share
their concerns about the challenges faced under neo-liberal globalisation. Even
though it does not drastically transform unions of regular workers in the big
corporations, these alliances could facilitate a social movement unionism that goes
beyond the wall of the company (see Moody, 1997; Munck, 2002; Turner and Hurd,
2001). Discourses on social movement unionism as an alternative to militant
economic unionism are appearing in South Korea (Cho, 2006; Roh, 2007). Thus,
contingent workers’ struggles, developed as social movement unionism, might be an
alternative to the company unionism that has engulfed big unions in South Korea
and led to weakness and decline in working class organisation.
Conclusion
Globalisation is an overwhelming phenomenon that aﬀects all nation-states.
However, the impact of globalisation varies greatly across countries since it is a
multi-layered process among various actors at diﬀerent levels. Globalisation in
South Korea displays two distinct features. First, globalisation has been
accompanied by democratisation. Although there was some time lag between
democratisation and the impact of neo-liberal globalisation, the conjuncture of two
great forces has generated some important constraints for the working class.
Secondly, globalisation in South Korea has been accelerated in a dramatic way. It
took only two years to experience post-crisis neo-liberal institutional reforms upon
entry to the OECD. The working class has experienced both new opportunities and
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new constraints caused by social changes accompanying democratisation and
globalisation.
Labour unions during the democratic transition became more empowered than
before. Relying on an oppressive state apparatus to control the labour movement or
using a cooptation strategy has become much more diﬃcult than before.
Nevertheless, fair and competitive elections and a free press cannot fully guarantee
workers’ rights. With the strong tradition of anti-labour actions by state bureaucrats
and politicians nurtured under the developmental state, the labour policies of the
new democratic government did not deviate much from those of the previous
government. Path dependency in the policy regime turned out to be strong even
under the rule of civilian presidents. Political democracy does not necessarily
guarantee democratisation of industrial relations and workers’ rights.
Paradoxically, globalisation provided new opportunities to break old fetters.
Korea’s membership of the OECD allowed a revision of the draconian labour
relations law made by the military junta. In a sense, globalisation has brought the
opportunity of full citizenship to Korean workers because revising the labour
relations law to meet international standards has improved workers’ rights.
However, Korean experiences also showed that labour relations have democratised
with the presence of the workers’ struggle after the revision of the labour law.
Interaction between international pressure and the workers’ struggle could override
the resistance from business and conservative political forces against the democratic
reform of the labour relations law.
One more twist has been that neo-liberal globalisation initiated by a democratic
government resulted in consequences that undermined the organisational base of the
union movement as labour market policies to enhance ﬂexibility were introduced.
The agreement between the IMF and the Korean government imposed strong policy
constraints on the new government. As neo-liberal globalisation by the democra-
tically elected government proceeded, workers’ rights were curtailed and threatened.
The rapid expansion of contingent workers generated not only a working poor but
also a serious impediment for the union movement. Company unions became more
eager to pursue economic security for only union members in a militant way. With
the gaining popularity of social movement organisations, unions became margin-
alised from social movements in the 2000s. In addition, the fragmentation of workers
has been furthered by an inﬂux of immigrant workers. In short, the Korean labour
movement faces new challenges caused by globalisation, which creates complex
cleavages among workers.
However, a new labour movement has emerged with the rise of the contingent
workers’ struggle. Marginalised workers under neo-liberal globalisation have staged
prolonged strikes to get workers’ rights without much support from established
labour unions. Allied with social movement organisations, the subsequent victories
of contingent workers’ strikes provide an alternative labour movement to the
militant economic unionism that had characterised the orientation of the traditional
big company unions. So-called social movement unionism developed from the allied
collective action of diverse social groups and contingent workers might facilitate the
development of new labour movement in South Korea. We might expect a similar
development in other Asian countries that have undergone a similar social and
political change over the last two decades.
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Notes
1 There are many terms to identify contingent workers: ﬂexible, precarious, irregular and non-standard. In
this paper, those terms are used interchangeably.
2 Chung Joo Young criticised corruption and incompetence in the ruling party and the government’s
dealing with labour disputes. He represented a general sentiment of business with regard to labour
disputes. Business complained about the retreat of police and security forces from labour relations while
labour disputes were increasing and unions became more powerful and recalcitrant in collective
bargaining.
3 The winning of the presidential election with a very low rate of supporters has been a common feature
of an outcome of the presidential election in South Korea. It has undermined legitimacy and authority of
the leadership of president. The proportion of votes that winners of presidential elections received out of
the total eligible vote were the following: 32.6% for Roh Tae Woo (1987), 34.4% for Kim Young Sam
(1992), 32.5% for Kim Dae Jung (1997), 34.6% for Roh Moo-Hyun (2002) and 30.7% for Lee Myung
Bak (2007).
4 The proportion of non-standard workers varies from 36% to 57% according to the diﬀerent deﬁnition
of non-standard workers. While Kim Yoo-Sun, a director of the private labour institute, argues that it
was almost 57% in 2001, Ahn Ju-Youp and others, a group of researchers from the Korea Labour
Institute, a government-sponsored institute, argue that it was around 37% in 2005. For more details, see
Kim (2001) and Ahn (2005). The Tripartite Commission deﬁned the concept of non-standard workers as
including regular full-time workers, regular temporary workers and regular part-time workers.
According to the deﬁnition of the Tripartite Commission, the rate of non-standard workers in 2008
was 35.9%, 5,703,000 employees out of 15,883,000 employees. See KLI (2008). Applying a diﬀerent
deﬁnition of non-standard workers, Kim (2008b) estimated that the rate of non-standard workers was
52.1%, 840,000 out of 16,104,000 in 2007.
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